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ABSTRACT 
We highlight how directors and senior managers perceive the roles of a board to involve 
overseeing risk and compliance, strategy, governance, developing the CEO and senior 
management and managing stakeholders. We find that managers and directors perceive board 
effectiveness as linked to different combinations of these roles and that there appear to be 
differences in perceptions between different types of firms. We conclude that clarity around 
the board’s role set is critical to furthering the corporate governance research agenda, and that 
the relationship between board roles and perceived board effectiveness differs between 
managers and directors. 
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Extensive research has failed to develop a consensus as to how boards of directors 
add value to the corporations they govern (Daily, Dalton & Cannella 2003). Amongst many 
issues, the board’s role set (how the board influences firm performance) is conceptualized by 
different researchers in different ways. Mintzberg (1983) saw seven roles of a board; Hung 
(1998) documented six roles; Zahra & Pearce (1989) provided for three; Johnson, Daily, 
Dalton and Ellstrand (1996) a different three; and Hillman and Dalziel (2004) provided an 
integrative model of two roles. Measurement around these roles, and board characteristics 
required by them, remains unclear (Daily, Johnson & Dalton 1999). This reflects a lengthy 
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tradition of investigating the contribution of boards to firm performance (Andrews 1980; 
Mace 1971), the conclusions of which range from those viewed as ceremonial or ineffectual 
bodies through to key decision-making groups fundamental to corporate survival and 
performance. Advancing the understanding of board effectiveness requires resolution of the 
ambiguous conceptualization of board roles. Hence, the purpose of this paper is to empirically 
assess how managerial elites (Pettigrew 1992) conceptualize board roles.  
We begin by reviewing the characterization of board roles in the literature and then 
present the findings of a survey of corporate elites that tests two synthesized models of board 
roles. We find that clarity around the board’s role set is critical to furthering the corporate 
governance research agenda and that the relationship between board roles and perceived 
board effectiveness differs between managers and directors. 
BACKGROUND 
Conceptualising what boards do is complex, exacerbated by the ongoing evolution of 
a board’s legal duties and societal expectations (Baxt 2005). Over the past 30 years however, 
management discipline has highlighted the real and tangible influence of boards on 
corporations. Early attempts (Eisenberg 1969; Conard 1976) at defining board roles 
emphasize the differential conceptualization of boards by different disciplines (and often by 
researchers within the same discipline). Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) identified three key roles: 
as a co-optive mechanism accessing resources vital to the organization; as boundary spanners; 
and enhancing organizational legitimacy (not, interestingly, controlling or overseeing 
management). In contrast, Mintzberg (1983) is more specific: selecting the CEO, taking 
control in crises, monitoring management, co-opting resources from the external environment, 
fundraising, building the organization’s reputation, and providing advice to management.  
Both Pettigrew (1992) and Hung (1998) identified different themes of research into 
boards and managerial elites. Pettigrew’s (1992) themes are the study of interlocking 
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directorates and of institutional and societal power; the study of boards and directors; and the 
composition and correlates of top management teams. Hung (1998) found that boards link the 
organization to the external environment; coordinate the interests of shareholders, 
stakeholders and public; control the behaviour of management to ensure the organization 
achieves it objectives; formulate strategy; maintain the status quo of the organization; and 
support management.  
These conceptualisations have led to a more holistic but imprecise set of constructs, 
with researchers arguing there are only two roles: controlling the organization (including 
strategy and monitoring) and providing access to resources (including advising management) 
(Boyd 1990; Hillman & Dalziel 2003). Unfortunately, decreasing discrimination does not 
allow researchers to better understand what boards do. Other seminal reviews of the research 
agenda suffer from similar breadth of specification and overlap or contradiction in the role set.  
Two of the most cited reviews of the corporate governance research agenda share a three-role 
conceptualization, but the role sets differ. Zahra and Pearce (1989) identified the three roles of 
the board as being service (including providing access to resources),  strategy and control, 
while Johnson et al. (1996) conceptualized the roles as control, service (which included the 
board’s role in strategic decision making) and providing access to resources.  
To better understand the source of these difficulties, we review the conventions of 
what boards do – namely control, service, strategy and access to resources. We focus on  
conceptualisations that involve two components – what a board does and how it does it. 
The Board’s Control Role 
Supervising management and protecting shareholders is seen as central to what 
boards do (Keasey & Wright 1993). This is driven by directors’ fiduciary responsibilities 
(Bainbridge 2003) which, combined with the theoretical ascendency of agency theory, has led 
this role to dominate the research agenda (Daily et al. 2003).  
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While control is central, it is operationalized differentially by researchers. For some 
the role is enacted through hiring and firing senior management, particularly the CEO 
(Johnson et al. 1996). Others maintain a broader ‘how’ for the board through the maintenance 
of ‘decision control’ (Baysinger & Hoskisson 1990). When viewed in conjunction with a 
board’s ability to maintain ‘allocative control’ for large decisions, there are many ways that a 
board can exert ‘effective economic control’ of the corporation (Stiles & Taylor 2001: 121). 
Thus, how boards enact the control role is not clear-cut. The ability to remove 
management is seen by some as the condition for control being present (Mizruchi 1983), 
while others identify specific activities in which boards participate as part of the control 
mechanism. Fama and Jensen (1983: 303) adopt this approach with decision-making rights, 
splitting decision-making into a board role (‘ratify’ and ‘monitor’ management positions) and 
a management role (‘initiate’ and ‘implement’ action). The differences in approach are driven 
by researchers’ perspectives on control. Some adopt a list of control-related board activities 
such as monitoring the CEO, monitoring strategy implementation, planning CEO succession, 
and evaluating, as well as rewarding top management (Hillman & Dalziel 2003). Others 
approach the problem by invoking concepts of control systems, such as strategic and financial 
control (Baysinger & Hoskisson 1990) or even the relevant mechanisms that can be used, 
such as specific internal and external controls (Dalton, Daily, Johnson & Ellstrand 1999).  
These approaches become even more ambiguous where researchers’ terminology 
varies. Thus, control systems have been labelled as strategic or financial; and also as 
operational or strategic (Stiles & Taylor 2001), a terminology that resembles the activist 
versus passive approach of Golden and Zajac (2001). 
The Board’s Service Role 
Difficulties in conceptualising board roles become yet more obvious when reviewing 
the service role of the board, the range of which varies from a limited but seemingly 
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ubiquitous ‘service/expertise/counsel role’ (Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand & Johnson 1998: 273) to 
a concentrated role in ‘generating and analysing strategic alternatives’ (Forbes & Milliken 
1999: 292); a position that could be confused with others’ use of the strategy role. While 
researchers into the service role concentrate on a primarily inward focused role (advising), 
others see the role as being both internally and externally focused such that it extends beyond 
‘giving counsel and advice to executives’ to include ‘enhancing company reputation and 
establishing contacts with the external environment’ (Zahra & Pearce 1989: 292). This 
external role has been defined separately by several authorities; for instance Johnson et al. 
(1996: 411) term it a ‘resource dependence role’ while Stiles and Taylor (2001: 27) term it an 
‘institutional role’.  
The Board’s Strategy Role 
As with control and service, there is no clear articulation about what is meant by the 
strategy role of the board. For instance, the strategic role of the board has been conceptualized 
as a continuum from ‘approving, monitoring and reviewing strategy at one end, to a 
leadership role of active involvement in establishing the goals, values and setting direction at 
the other end’ (Ingley & Van der Walt 2001: 176). Others see specific roles for the board, 
such as reviewing initiatives and ‘in some cases’ involvement in formulation (Johnson et al. 
1996: 427).  
Thus, there are contrasts between researchers who envisage a broad (Schmidt & 
Brauer 2006) or a lesser role (Westphal & Fredrickson 2001) for the board in strategy. Others 
use the strategy role as the basis for a broad categorization of the board itself. Henke (1986) 
sets out initiator boards and contrasts them with approving boards, while Demb and Neubauer 
(1992) characterize boards as watchdogs, trustees or pilots. More generally, boards can be 
seen as passive or active (Golden & Zajac 2001); perhaps an oversimplification (Hendry & 
Kiel 2004)?   
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The Board’s Access to Resources Role 
The externally focussed co-opting role of the board is perhaps the most readily 
agreed upon. With the exception of authors who characterize this activity as part of the 
service role (Johnson et al. 1996; Stiles & Taylor 2001), most agree there is a role in 
providing the company with access to resources (Hillman & Dalziel 2003). The basic concept 
behind this is that firms can use board members to assist in controlling their operating 
environments or to secure critical resources (Pfeffer & Salancik 1978). Research in this area 
has a long tradition (Selznick 1949) across  a number of different contexts (Boyd 1990; 
Pfeffer & Nowak 1976; Zald 1967), but again with various conceptualizations. Mintzberg 
(1983) highlights the three key activities of fundraising, co-opting resources and building the 
firm’s reputation. In contrast, Hung (1998) describes the three key elements as linking, 
coordinating and legitimising. 
Hence, board roles involve a mix of what and how; i.e. boards can choose to focus on 
a number of topics (such as strategy, risk, finances, etc.), and they can choose to act on those 
topics in a number of different ways. Consequently, when researchers or practitioners 
concentrate on what a board does in topics such as compliance or risk management or strategy 
or oversight of the CEO, the agenda or advice is silent on how a board executes this role. 
Does the board formulate actions in these areas, or merely review and approve management 
plans, for example?   Others however focus on how boards are undertaking action across these 
topics, at the expense of the topic – the what – on which a board is taking action. For instance, 
research or practice focuses on the board’s monitoring activities, which would include 
monitoring compliance, risk, strategy, the CEO’s performance and so on. The issue here is 
that boards may well monitor different topics to a greater or lesser extent. 
These difficulties are based on the fact that a board’s role is operationalized not just by 
the topic (or ‘practice’) but ‘through the "doing of governing", i.e. how they actually do their 
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practice...’ (Pye 2002: 153). Thus, discrepancies between the various definitions of board 
roles are based on different conceptualisations of the mix between the what of the role with 
the how of the role.  
Nonprofit Approaches 
 The literature on board roles in nonprofit boards is similar to the for-profit literature, 
particularly the topic delineations (Ferkins, Shilbury and McDonald 2005). For instance, 
Inglis (1997) refers to four roles, namely mission, planning (strategy), executive director 
relations and community relations (access to resources). Other approaches take a more 
activity-based perspective or a combination of topics and activities. For example, Axelrod 
(1994) highlights nine roles and Soltz (1997) reports on ten roles that address a number of 
strategic and control topic areas regarding board roles.  
Empirical investigations in the nonprofit literature have typically used factor analysis 
to label latent constructs representing similar board activities. For instance, Inglis, Alexander 
and Weaver (1999) denoted 14 different activities of community nonprofit boards that were 
represented as topic roles in terms of strategic activities, operation and resource planning. 
Similarly, Taylor, Chait and Holland (1996) identified activity-related dimensions including 
educational, contextual, strategic, analytical, political and interpersonal dimensions. Overall, 
the literature highlights that, as with research in the for-profit sector, there is a great deal of 
ambiguity in approaches taken in attempting to understand and describe the dimensions 
related to nonprofit board roles.  
Practitioner Insights 
Academic ambiguity about the role of the board is replicated in and complicated by 
the normative literature. In addition to addressing issues of what boards do, practitioners often 
focus on the goal of the board. Thus, in one of the first in-depth practitioner reviews of 
governance, the board’s role was pronounced as to ‘…ensure that corporate management is 
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continuously and effectively striving for above-average performance, taking account of risk. 
This is not to deny the board’s additional role with respect to shareholder protection.’ (Hilmer 
1993: 71). This is actually an articulation of what the board is trying to do rather than the 
what or how of its roles. 
Practitioner work that explores the issue of board roles tends to produce lists of board 
activities (Business Roundtable 1978; American Bar Association 1978; Higgs Review 2003; 
Hampel Report 1998; Cadbury Report 1992; Standards Australia 2003; ASX Corporate 
Governance Council 2007). All of these reports and guidelines recognize the importance of 
profitability and economic viability of the corporation as goals or outcomes for which boards 
should aim, as well as ensuring that corporate decisions comply with the norms and standards 
of society. There are, however, significant differences in how these generic areas are 
implemented. 
An analysis of the key guidelines for directors (available from the authors) indicates 
that it is possible to correlate academic interest and practitioner recommendations on the roles 
of a board and, while there is significant overlap, there is also significant divergence in 
emphasis. Both groups place considerable emphasis on the monitoring and evaluation role of 
the board. Contrasting the two groups, however, we see that practitioners place more 
emphasis on the board's role in setting strategic direction. Practitioners also place emphasis on 
very specific aspects of monitoring such as compliance.  
Another point of difference involves the access to resources role. While it is the 
subject of substantial academic investigation, the role is rarely mentioned by practitioners, 
with the notable exception of a specific board role in maintaining relationships with investors, 
particularly institutional investors. The service or advice role of the board has not been a 
major focus of either academic or practitioner interest with one or two notable exceptions 
(Westphal 1999).  
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Conclusions on Extant Research 
Current attempts to categorize a general set of board roles remain ambiguous and 
often vague. The language often mixes the outcomes or targets of a board with the role set, or 
mixes the topic of the role with the process of the role. This confusion is due to current role 
sets based on either inference from single focus archival studies or the interpretation of 
complex interview data in one-off studies where language used to describe the roles can be 
highly variable. While these methods are important steps in refining our understanding of the 
board’s role set, it is also critical that we have an approach that provides cross-study clarity 
about roles if we are to investigate how boards add value. Without understanding the actual 
processes by which boards contribute to firm performance, we may find that directors actually 
fulfil multiple roles leading to confounded empirical results (Mintzberg 1983). For example, 
independent board members drawn from outside of the organization’s usual domain of 
operation are thought to be able to address managerial opportunism more effectively, as their 
independence is more likely to allow them to sanction the CEO and management 
(Sundaramurthy & Lewis 2003). However, such outsiders will also often bring a diversity of 
expertise and perspectives from which management can draw. Thus, they could be thought to 
increase the service role of the board. Similarly, their social networks will differ from that of 
the management team, and we could expect outsiders to bridge structural holes (Burt 1992) 
and bring competitive advantage through access to key resources. Hence, understanding the 
process by which boards and directors add value is critical if we are to assist in improving 
corporate governance. 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The preceding literature review demonstrates that different researchers perceive 
board roles as activities free of topics (e.g. monitoring), topics free of activities (e.g. strategy) 
or some unique combination of the two (e.g. monitoring strategy). Given the differing 
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theoretical approaches to board roles, we were interested in understanding whether 
managerial elites conceptualize the roles as activity-based or as topic-based. For instance, if 
we took a specific board action (e.g. advising management on strategy), we wanted to 
understand if elites conceptualize the action as an activity (i.e. advising) or as a topic (i.e. the 
subject matter of the strategy or direction, rather than how the strategy function was 
executed). Given the intersection of activities (establishing boundaries/delegating, 
engaging/advising management and monitoring/reviewing) and topics of focus (strategy, 
compliance, risk management, stakeholder management or engagement, etc.) it was important 
to differentiate between the two.  Thus our competing research hypotheses were: 
H1a: Managerial elites conceptualize board roles based on the 
topics with which a board is involved. 
H1b: Managerial elites conceptualize board roles based on the 
activities with which a board is involved. 
Further, we were interested in understanding if and how the role set was related to 
perceptions of board effectiveness. We were particularly interested in understanding 
differences in perception across different categories of elites: directors only (also called Non-
Executive Directors (NEDs) or outsiders); directors who are also managers (also called 
Executive directors or insiders); and managers who were not directors. Given the different 
motivations, experiences and understanding of board roles between these categories, our 
specific hypothesis was: 
H2: Different categories of managerial elites ascribe board 
effectiveness to different board roles. 
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METHOD 
Participants 
Surveys were distributed to members of one of Australia’s premier professional 
associations for managerial elites, the Australian Institute of Management (Queensland and 
Northern Territory Division). Since we were interested in investigating board members and 
managers who directly interacted with boards on a regular basis, we limited the survey to 
1356 Fellows and Associate Fellows (out of over 19,000 members). 
There were 148 responses to the survey. Given the elite status of our target 
participants and our conservative estimation of the 11% response rate (many survey recipients 
would not have been board members or managers who directly deal with board members on a 
regular basis), this represents an acceptable response rate. There was no response bias. 
Analysis 
We undertook an exploratory factor analysis to understand whether participants 
viewed board roles as activity or topic focused. Next, confirmatory factor analysis was 
conducted in order to develop an appropriate board roles scale for the roles identified in the 
earlier analysis. Finally, hierarchical multiple regression was employed to determine the 
predictive ability of the board roles factors on board effectiveness.  
Measures 
Since the aim of this research was to understand how board roles were 
conceptualised, we did not begin with a firm set of constructs. Instead, we developed a series 
of 44 items that contained a mix of an activity (e.g. setting boundaries, engaging with 
management, reviewing, etc.) and topics (e.g. strategy, compliance, risk, etc.) that were based 
on a combination of a series of 45 structured interviews as well as the normative and 
academic literature outlined earlier. 
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Once the data were collected, these items were subjected to exploratory factor 
analysis to determine how the various board role items loaded onto factors. Investigation of 
the pattern matrix identified 15 items that loaded onto five factors. These were used as the 
basis for developing the scale for board roles. 
Board roles 
Five board roles were assessed using items generated, from existing theoretical 
approaches to defining the roles of boards. Each of the five scales was assessed using three 
items that were rated from 1 (no involvement) to 5 (high involvement). Example items for 
each scale include ‘Routinely reviewing the company’s compliance performance’ 
(compliance and risk role); ‘Engaging with management when defining respective 
responsibilities of the board’ (governance role); ‘Periodically reassessing the company’s 
strategic direction’ (strategy role); ‘Engaging with the CEO in the development of his/her 
performance’ (management development role); and ‘Establishing limits or guidelines for 
stakeholder engagement plans’ (access to resources role).  
Board effectiveness  
Board effectiveness was assessed using a five-item scale rated from 1 (very poor) to 
5 (very good). Participants rated the effectiveness of the board from a number of perspectives 
including ‘strategy’, ‘compliance management’ and ‘ensuring an appropriate governance 
system is in place and operative’. 
RESULTS 
Overview of the Participants 
Participants represented a wide range of company types, board size, organization size 
and elite status. Approximately 28% of respondents were from private companies, 11% from 
public companies, 6% from listed companies, 12% were government owned corporations and 
33% were from nonprofit organizations. In terms of board size, 22% of participants were on a 
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board with four or fewer members, 16% of participants were on boards with more than 10 
members and the majority of respondents (62%) served on boards with between four and 10 
members. The spread of company size (determined by number of employees) showed that 
23% of participants’ organizations had fewer than 20 employees, 34% had 20-99 employees, 
21% had 100-499 employees and 23% had 500 or more employees. In terms of managerial 
elite status, 27% of participants identified as non-executive directors, 24% as managing 
directors or executive directors 20% as CEOs (but not directors), and 29% as senior managers 
(who were not directors).  
The majority of organizations (57%) operated in a single industry. Forty percent of 
organizations operated in between two and five industries, while only three percent operated 
in six or more industries. Of the individual industries represented, the health industry 
comprised the most companies (32%), followed by education (19%), transport (18%), 
property and business services (17%), finance and insurance (16%), personal and other 
services (13%), and government, administration and defense (12%). The cultural and 
recreational services, communication, accommodation and retail industries each accounted for 
less than 10% of the organizations represented.  
Data and Analyses 
Scale development  
Descriptive statistics and correlations relating to five board roles factors are 
displayed in Table 1. SPSS 15.0 was used to conduct an exploratory factor analysis on the 
sample to determine how the various board role items loaded onto factors. An oblique rotation 
using principal axis factoring extraction was requested. Investigation of the pattern matrix 
identified 15 items that loaded onto the five factors at a level above 0.5.  
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
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Using AMOS 5.0 (Arbuckle, 1996), a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was 
conducted to further assess the fit of the exploratory model to the data (Anderson & Gerbing 
1988). Our analysis also addressed issues relating to sample size, normality of data and 
missing data. Initially, maximum likelihood (ML) estimation was employed in the analysis as 
reliable estimates have been obtained by ML estimation based on sample sizes as low as 50 
(Gerbing & Anderson 1985). This method assumes normality of the data which was an 
assumption that was violated in this sample. To ensure non-normal data did not influence the 
results, a Bollen-Stine bootstrap procedure was employed which indicated that the chi-square 
indicator of model fit was not inflated. Lastly, inspection of the missing data indicated it was 
random. As per Allison (2002), an expectation maximization (EM) algorithm was used to 
replace missing data via the missing value analysis (MVA) function in SPSS. Fit indices 
relating to the CFA are displayed in Table 2 and indicate a reasonable fit of the model to the 
data. Table 3 displays the items that loaded onto each latent factor and the standardized 
estimates resulting from the CFA. 
Two further tests were conducted to ensure that common method variance was not 
associated with the self-report data. First, Harmon’s single factor test (see Podsakoff, 
MacKenzie, Lee, and Podsakoff 2003) revealed a five factor solution via exploratory factor 
analysis. The five factors accounted for 72% of variance, with the first factor accounting for 
43% of variance. This indicates that common method effects were not a likely contaminant to 
the results of this investigation. A second test was conducted via CFA controlling for the 
effects of a single unmeasured latent method factor (see Podsakoff et al 2003). The results 
revealed that the method variance factor improved model fit by only a very small amount and 
thus common method variance is not considered to be a pervasive issue in this study.  
As a result, managerial elites appear to conceptualize their roles according to the five 
topics outlined in the heading row of Table 3, namely Risk and Compliance; Governance; 
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Strategy; Management Oversight and Development; and Stakeholder Management. Thus, 
Hypothesis 1a is supported. There was no support for Hypothesis 1b that elites conceptualize 
their roles according to activity or how they carry out the activity. 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Tests of the Predictive Ability of the Model  
Several hierarchical regression analyses were performed to investigate the predictive 
ability of the model developed above on self-reported board effectiveness. This analysis was 
conducted for four groups within the data (see table 4).  
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 about here 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Directors. For directors, entry of the model (i.e. risk and compliance, governance, 
strategy, management oversight and development, and stakeholder management) at step one 
did not account for a significant increment on variance of board effectiveness. Despite the 
lack of significance for the model, the data indicated a significant association between the 
strategy role and higher board effectiveness. Within this analysis, compliance, access, and 
governance roles were not significantly associated with higher board effectiveness although 
the management development role was significant in a negative association. Overall, this 
result indicates that directors perceived the strategy role as significantly predictive of board 
effectiveness and the role of management development as negatively related to board 
effectiveness.  
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Directors who are also managers. Results revealed that entry of the board roles as a 
set on step one did not account for a significant increment on variance of board effectiveness. 
Further inspection reveals that none of the board roles were significantly associated with 
perceptions of board effectiveness.  
Managers who are not directors. Entry of the model (i.e. risk and compliance, 
governance, strategy, management oversight and development, and stakeholder management) 
at step one did not account for a significant increment on variance of board effectiveness. For 
managers who are not directors, however, there was a perception that the stakeholder 
engagement role was negatively related to board effectiveness. Further, the rating of the 
strategic role neared significance in the prediction of effectiveness. 
All managers. Results revealed that entry of the predictors as a set accounted for a 
significant increment on variance of board effectiveness. Further inspection of the results 
revealed that the strategic role was perceived as positively related to board effectiveness. The 
ratings of managing stakeholders neared significance in a negative association with board 
effectiveness.  
All directors and managers. Entry of the board role predictors as a set accounted for 
a significant increment on variance of board effectiveness. Further inspection of the results 
revealed that the strategic role was positively related to board effectiveness. The ratings of 
stakeholder management neared significance in negatively predicting effectiveness.  
In summary, these analyses indicate that all categories of the elites believed the 
strategy role was positively associated with board effectiveness. In contrast though, managers 
(particularly managers who are not directors) perceive board involvement in stakeholder 
management as negatively associated with board effectiveness, whereas directors did not 
appear to have a strong association between this role and board effectiveness. Interestingly, 
directors perceive their role in management development as negatively related to board 
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effectiveness which was opposite to the effect that managers perceived. Thus, H2 (Different 
categories of managerial elites ascribe board effectiveness to different board roles.) was 
supported for the topics of stakeholder management and management development, but not 
for the topic of strategy. 
Nonprofit versus for-profit  
Several hierarchical regression analyses were also performed to investigate the 
predictive ability of the model on self-reported board effectiveness as a function of for-profit 
or nonprofit/government organizations and boards (see table 5).  
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 5 about here 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
All for-profit participants. Entry of the model (i.e. risk and compliance, governance, 
strategy, management oversight and development, and stakeholder management) at step one 
accounted for a significant increment on variance of board effectiveness. Further inspection of 
the data indicated a significant association between the strategy role and board effectiveness, 
such that the strategic role was significantly related to higher perceptions of board 
effectiveness for the for-profit boards. As Table 5 shows, the roles of risk and compliance, 
stakeholder management, management oversight and development, and governance were not 
significantly associated with higher board effectiveness.  
All nonprofit and government participants. Entry of the model (i.e. risk and 
compliance, governance, strategy, management oversight and development, and stakeholder 
management) at step one did not account for a significant increment on variance of perceived 
board effectiveness for participants from nonprofit or government sectors. Further inspection 
of the data revealed a significant negative association between the stakeholder management 
role and board effectiveness, such that the stakeholder management role was a significant 
predictor of lower board effectiveness for nonprofit and government entities. Within this 
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analysis, risk and compliance, management oversight and development, and the governance 
roles were not significantly associated with board effectiveness. The role of strategy was 
significant at alpha. This result indicates that respondents perceived the strategy role as being 
related to higher board effectiveness while stakeholder management was perceived as being 
related to more ineffective boards.  
Single versus multiple industry engagement  
Several hierarchical regression analyses were also performed to investigate whether 
the relationships between board roles and self-reported board effectiveness differed as a 
function of the respondent’s organization’s engagement in just one industry as compared to 
being ‘diversified’ across several industries (see Table 6).  
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 6 about here 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Single industry participants. Entry of the model (i.e. risk and compliance, 
governance, strategy, management oversight and development, and stakeholder management) 
at step one accounted for a significant increment on variance of board effectiveness. Further 
inspection of the data indicated a significant association between the strategy role and board 
effectiveness, such that the strategic role was a significant predictor of higher board 
effectiveness for single industry participants. As per Table 6, the roles of risk and compliance, 
management oversight and development, and governance were not significantly associated 
with higher board effectiveness, although the role of stakeholder management was significant. 
This result indicates that for single industry participants, stakeholder access was related to 
lower perceptions of board effectiveness.  
Multiple industry participants. Entry of the model (i.e. risk and compliance, 
governance, strategy, management oversight and development, and stakeholder management) 
at step one in the hierarchical regression analyses did not account for a significant increment 
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on variance of board effectiveness for multiple industry participants. Within this analysis, 
none of the five board roles were significantly related to ratings of board effectiveness.  
DISCUSSION 
These results have important implications for future board research. A major motivation 
for this study was the lack of a unified approach to studying how boards add value, with 
scholars falling into one of two camps. At one end, theory and review articles concentrate on 
a minimal number of very broad roles. At the other end are either very fine-grained studies of 
one particular aspect of board performance or a list of potential activities that a board 
undertakes or is involved with. Adding to this confusion is the widespread practice of 
inferring what boards do based on their demographics. 
This research provides a clear direction for further development. The results indicate 
that members of the corporate elite perceive the roles of the board as defined by five topics 
which incorporate a number of activities required to address these topics of focus.  This is a 
potentially important step to help guide the research agenda. For instance, referring to the 
‘monitoring’ or ‘advising’ role of a board is largely erroneous in terms of directors’ and 
senior managers’ perceptions; to ensure clarity, it is more important to understand what the 
board is ‘monitoring’ or ‘advising’ on. Therefore, researchers interested in board performance 
relationships may have more success in delimiting their research questions to specific topic-
based mechanisms (strategy or risk), rather than broad activities (such as monitoring or 
advising) as has previously dominated approaches in governance research. This approach 
focuses on the how of director-board interaction but is silent (or assumed) on the what.  
Other topics for research include risk and compliance activities, securing external 
resources and so on. These changes in the research agenda would allow differentiation 
between what issues directors focus on versus how directors execute their roles. Similarly, 
practitioners and public policymakers may have greater success by employing specific 
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topic/area-based interventions, rather than by using broader, activity-based interventions. For 
instance, policy initiatives aimed at increasing a board’s oversight or monitoring role may 
lead to changes in one topic (e.g. oversight in compliance with accounting standards) but not 
affect other significant topics with potentially more impact for future performance (e.g. 
oversight of strategy). Thus, a broader consideration of all activities within a domain of focus 
may lead to a more effective board, rather than calls to increase activity on what may be 
topics of focus that do not affect corporate performance.  
Second (although largely indicative), the results highlight the roles that are perceived to 
add value to organisations and how this perception is affected by membership in a different 
category of corporate elite. The majority of research and advice on boards to date has 
concentrated on the monitoring or control aspects of a board’s work. Instead, our research 
indicates quite clearly that the area of strategy (including setting the direction through to 
monitoring) is perceived as positively associated with board effectiveness. This supports  calls 
in the literature to investigate the full range of influence that boards have over their 
organisations in the strategy function (for some rare exceptions on in-depth investigations into 
the board’s role in strategy, see McNulty & Pettigrew 1999; Parker 2007; Ravasi & Zattoni 
2006).  
These types of rich studies will be necessary across all board functions because different 
categories of the corporate elite have different perceptions of how boards add value. For 
instance, managers perceived board involvement with stakeholders as negatively associated 
with board effectiveness. This may be explained as a fear of part-time board members 
disturbing existing communication channels and relationships. While there are differences, 
there are also similarities; both board members and managers perceived the strategy role as 
positively associated with board effectiveness.  
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Interestingly, board members perceive their role in management development as 
negatively associated with board effectiveness, although this may be a reflection of boards 
where heavy involvement in management development is being associated with a poorly 
performing organization or a poor CEO selection (and hence poor rating of board 
performance). Management, in contrast, rated performance of the management development 
role as positively (though not significantly) associated with board effectiveness. 
There were also differences between for-profit and nonprofit boards. While results 
indicated that the strategy role was associated with superior board effectiveness for both for-
profit and nonprofit companies, there was an interesting difference in the stakeholder 
management role, particularly as participants from nonprofit boards indicated a negative 
association between perceptions of board effectiveness and active involvement of board 
members in managing key stakeholders. This result runs counter to much normative advice 
and many long-standing results (Selznick 1949). A possible explanation for this may be that 
there is too much involvement with stakeholders and therefore may indicate board members 
taking on a representative role – i.e. board members may become a voice for (or answerable 
to) the stakeholder rather than the company as a whole in the boardroom (Hillman, Nicholson 
& Shropshire 2008). This would indicate that board members need to manage a tension 
between co-opting resources for the firm and co-opting resources for the stakeholders (from 
the firm). 
While there were fewer indicative differences between multiple and single industry 
respondents, there appeared to be a stronger perception that the board’s role in strategy was 
positively associated with board effectiveness. Given the lower complexity of a single 
industry firm, this would appear to bear out the concept that boards can control strategically in 
these situations (Hendry & Kiel 2004). 
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Limitations and Future Research 
While this research empirically supports the idea that managerial elites perceive the 
board’s role as a series of five topics, a larger survey would significantly strengthen this 
conclusion. Such an approach would overcome potential limitations regarding sample frame, 
as well as possible non-response bias. Similarly, a larger respondent group would allow for 
increased statistical power that would enhance the findings of this research, particularly 
around differences in perception of board effectiveness between managers and board 
members as well as between different types of organizations. 
Future research will also need to examine if corporate elite perceptions match with more 
objective measures of board performance. While there are obvious benefits in understanding 
how managers and directors view their roles and the relationship between these roles and 
perceptions of effectiveness, this research has not addressed relationships between board roles 
and more objective measures of board or company performance.  
FINAL THOUGHTS 
Understanding how boards add value to the corporations they govern is an important 
topic for governance researchers, practitioners and policy makers. To date, academic output 
has largely assumed the composition of a board role set or relied on theoretical 
conceptualizations of the role set. This paper represents a first step in understanding some 
components of the ‘black box’ of corporate governance. It indicates that the managerial elite 
views the role of the board as activity-focused and, further, that different classes of the elite 
view board effectiveness as deriving from different roles. As such, it represents an important 
step in unifying practitioner emphasis and research focus through the use of a five-topic focus 
for corporate governance research. Articulating the difference between a topic of focus and 
the activity that executes can aid researchers in better conceptualising their models, and 
designing their methods. Additionally, it can also assist practitioners in better guiding and 
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facilitating more effective boards across all sectors. Future studies will work towards the 
strengthening of the validity of these initial findings.  
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics and zero-order correlations 
Scale Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1 Risk and compliance 3.84 .80 (.82)      
2 Governance 4.31 .64 .48** (.87)     
3 Strategy 4.42 .57 .40** .35**   (.70)     
4 Management development 3.90 .86 .39** .36** .49** (.80)   
5 Stakeholder management 3.54 .96 .39** .37** .35** .52** (.91)  
6 Effectiveness 3.44 .81 .10  .04 .33** .15 -.01 (.91) 
Note: Alpha coefficients appear in the diagonals. SD refers to standard deviation.  
* p < .05; ** p < .01
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              Table 2. Goodness of fit statistics for confirmatory factor analysis 
Goodness of Fit Statistics Value 
Chi-square 139.68 
DF 80 
Chi-square/DF 1.75 
CFI .95 
RMSEA .07 
Standardised RMR .05 
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Table 3. Items and standardized estimates resulting from CFA 
Item Risk and Compliance Governance Strategy 
Management 
Development 
Stakeholder 
Management 
Periodically reviewing the company’s risk management performance .73**     
Engaging with management in the development of compliance indicators .78**     
Routinely reviewing the company’s compliance performance .85**     
Defining the respective responsibilities of the board in the governance system  .64**    
Engaging with management when defining respective responsibilities of the board  .86**    
Periodically reviewing the performance of the board as a whole   .77**    
Approving the company’s key performance indicators   .65**   
Periodically reassessing the company’s strategic direction   .63**   
Routinely reviewing the company’s performance against business plans   .76**   
Engaging with the CEO in the development of his/her performance    .71**  
Engaging with the CEO when developing the management remuneration policy    .85**  
Establishing limits or guidelines on the management remuneration policy    .73**  
Establishing limits or guidelines for stakeholder engagement plans     .86** 
Approving high-level stakeholder engagement plans     .86** 
Routinely reviewing the performance of stakeholder engagement activities     .93** 
** Significant at p < .001  
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Table 4. Hierarchical multiple regression analyses showing main effects of board roles on 
board effectiveness 
Sample 
Characteristics R
2 
Board Roles 
Risk and 
Compliance 
β 
Stakeholder 
Management 
β 
Management 
Development 
β 
Governance 
β 
Strategy 
β 
Directors only .17 .17 -.09 -.39* -.10 .46** 
Directors who are 
managers .26 .20 -.09 .15 -.05 .36 
Managers only .13 .17 -.40** .09 -.07 .24* 
All managers .12** .15 -.26* .16 -.09 .27** 
All participants 
(i.e., managers 
and directors) 
.12** .09 -.18* .04 -.02 .33** 
* p =< .10; ** p < .05. 
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Table 5. Hierarchical multiple regression analyses showing main effects of board roles 
on board effectiveness in for-profit and nonprofit/government organisations 
Sector of 
Engagement R
2 
Board Roles 
Risk and 
Compliance 
β 
Stakeholder 
Management 
β 
Management
Development
β 
Governance 
β 
Strategy 
β 
For-profit  .25** .03 -.09 .05 -.01 .49** 
Nonprofit/ 
Government  .12 .16 -.32
** -.01 -.04 .27* 
* p =< .10; ** p < .05. 
31 
Table 6. Hierarchical multiple regression analyses showing main effects of board roles 
on board effectiveness as a function of organizations engaging a single industry or 
multiple industries  
Industry 
Involvement R
2 
Board Roles 
Risk and 
Compliance 
β 
Stakeholder 
Management 
β 
Management
Development
β 
Governance 
β 
Strategy 
β 
Single industry .16** .16 -.21* .004 -.11 .39** 
Multiple industries .10 -.04 -.16 .09 .14 .23 
  * p =< .10; ** p < .05. 
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